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We show here that the recent work of Wolf and Wullschleger (quant-ph/0502030) on oblivious
transfer apparently opens the possibility that non-local correlations which are stronger than those
in quantum mechanics could be used for bit-commitment. This is surprising, because it is the
very existence of non-local correlations which in quantum mechanics prevents bit-commitment. We
resolve this apparent paradox by stressing the difference between non-local correlations and oblivious
transfer, based on the time-ordering of their inputs and outputs, which prevents bit-commitment.
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [1] proposed a quantum
physics scheme (BB84) by which two parties can establish
a secret key, allowing them to communicate with uncon-
ditional security against eavesdroppers. This result re-
mains one of the cornerstones of quantum cryptography,
and gave rise to the hope that many other cryptographic
primitives (which classically rely on unprovable assump-
tions), could be made unconditionally secure within a
quantum framework. Perhaps the best known of these is
bit commitment.
A bit-commitment scheme allows one party (Alice) to
commit to a decision in such a way as a second party
(Bob) will believe her when she later reveals it, but can-
not find out her decision until that point (eg. Alice’s
decision is sealed in a safe which is given to Bob, while
Alice keeps the key. Then in the revealing stage, Alice
sends the key to Bob).
Using the same encoding scheme as for key-
distribution, Bennett and Brassard constructed a quan-
tum coin-tossing protocol [1] that could directly be used
for bit-commitment. Their protocol is secure when Al-
ice is limited to using only separable states. However,
as noted by the authors, Alice can cheat convincingly in
their protocol by using entangled states.
This result was later expanded by Mayers [2], and by
Lo and Chow [3], to show that Alice can cheat in any
quantum bit-commitment scheme which is secure against
Bob. It is therefore impossible to implement an uncondi-
tionally secure bit-commitment scheme within quantum
physics.
Entangled quantum states are crucial in proving this
no-bit-commitment result, allowing correlations to exist
between Alice’s and Bob’s systems which cannot be sim-
ulated by any local hidden-variable model [4]. These
‘non-local’ correlations do not allow for super-luminal sig-
nalling, but are nevertheless extremely powerful [5].
Interestingly, Popescu and Rohrlich have shown that
quantum states do not provide the strongest possible
non-local correlations consistent with relativity [6]. For
two parties, who both have a single binary input (their
measurement setting) and a binary output (their mea-
surement result), the strongest possible correlations are
instead given by systems known as PR-boxes [6, 7, 8].
PR-boxes are a valuable conceptual tool in understand-
ing non-locality, as they allow us to separate the concept
of non-local non-signalling correlations from the details of
a particular physical model (eg. Complex Hilbert space).
PR-boxes (and their analogues with more inputs and
outputs) are also very general. All bipartite no-signalling
boxes with binary inputs and outputs can be constructed
from a PR-box and a mixture of local operations [7]. Fur-
thermore, a single PR-box (with shared randomness) can
be used to simulate the results of any bipartite measure-
ment on a maximally entangled quantum singlet state
[8].
Recently, Wolf and Wullschleger [9] have shown that
a PR-box can also be used to simulate a cryptographic
primitive known as one-out-of-two oblivious transfer [10,
11], in which Bob can secretly learn either (but not both)
of two bits submitted by Alice. We will refer to the device
which implements this scheme as an OT-box.
Interestingly, it is known that OT-boxes can be used
to implement secure bit commitment. If OT-boxes can
be built from PR-boxes, then this implies that bit com-
mitment can be achieved using PR-boxes. This would
be a surprising result, as PR-box correlations are very
similar to those attainable in quantum theory, where, as
emphasized previously, no bit-commitment is possible.
In order to investigate this argument in more detail,
this letter is organized as follows. First, we introduce the
requirements for a bit commitment scheme and give an
explicit example of such a scheme using OT-boxes. Next,
we recall Wolf and Wullschleger’s connection between the
PR- and the OT-boxes. Finally, we show that the anal-
ogous scheme involving PR-boxes does not in fact allow
secure bit-commitment and elaborate on its significance.
Formally, a Bit commitment scheme consists of two
protocols (COMMIT and REVEAL) which satisfy the
following requirements:
1. Correctness: If Alice and Bob are both honest,
then during the COMMIT protocol, Alice selects
a value for her committed bit α ∈ {0, 1}, and this
value is learnt by Bob during the REVEAL proto-
col.
22. Privacy: If Alice is honest, then Bob can learn
nothing about α until the REVEAL protocol is en-
acted.
3. Binding: If Bob is honest, then after the COM-
MIT protocol has finished, there is (at most) only
one specific value of α (e.g. α = 0) which Bob will
accept during the REVEAL protocol. He will never
accept the other possible value of α. This prevents
Alice from ‘changing her mind’ about which value
of α she committed.
A bit-commitment scheme satisfying these three con-
ditions would be perfectly secure. However, for crypto-
graphic purposes it is interesting to consider the slightly
weaker case of secure bit commitment, in which a bit-
commitment scheme can be made arbitrarily close to per-
fectly secure.
In particular, we consider a weakening of the binding
requirement to the following:
3. Secure binding: The scheme must permit arbi-
trarily large values of a security parameter Nǫ ∈ N,
such that if Bob is honest, then after the COMMIT
process has finished there is at most one value of α
(e.g. α = 0) which Bob will accept with probability
greater than 2−Nǫ in the REVEAL protocol. This
is Alice’s committed value of α.
Note that given a secure bit-commitment protocol with
secure binding parameter Nǫ = 1, it is possible to obtain
a protocol with an arbitrarily large security parameter
N ′ǫ by running 2N
′
ǫ − 1 copies of the Nǫ = 1 protocol in
parallel (with Bob only accepting Alice’s commitment if
she is not caught cheating in any of the parallel runs).
As the schemes we consider have perfect privacy, this will
not help Bob gain any further information about Alice’s
committed bit.
Now, it is possible to construct a secure bit-
commitment scheme using oblivious transfer. Following
Wolf and Wullschleger [9], we consider OT-boxes which
implement one-out-of-two oblivious transfer, in which Al-
ice inputs two bits, x0 and x1, into the system and Bob
inputs a single choice bit c. Finally, the system outputs
xc = x0 ⊕ c(x0 ⊕ x1) to Bob, where ⊕ denotes addition
modulo 2. This allows Bob to learn one of Alice’s two
input bits, without Alice knowing which bit he has ob-
tained (see figure 1).
A well-known way to implement bit-commitment from
one-out-of-two oblivious transfer is to use this to simulate
ordinary oblivious transfer [12] and then use the latter
for bit commitment [13]. Here we give an explicit pro-
tocol which uses one-out-of-two oblivious transfer (our
OT-box) to directly implement bit-commitment.
Consider first a scheme in which Alice and Bob share
a single OT-box, which is as follows:
COMMIT :
1. Alice selects a random bit r, and her commit-
ted bit α.
x y
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FIG. 1: A schematic representation of the PR-box (left), and
the OT-box (right) showing the input and output parameters
for Alice and Bob.
2. Alice inputs x0 = r and x1 = r ⊕ α into the
OT-box, where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2.
3. Alice sends a message to Bob telling him it is
his turn.
4. Bob selects a random bit s and inputs c = s
into the OT-box
5. Bob records the output bit xc. If the OT-box
fails to produce an output (as Alice has not
yet made her inputs), Bob knows that Alice is
cheating and will not accept her revealed bit.
REVEAL :
1. Alice sends α and r to Bob.
2. Bob checks to see if xc = r ⊕ αs. If this re-
lation is true, Bob accepts α as the revealed
bit, otherwise he knows that Alice has cheated
and rejects Alice’s revelation.
COMMIT and REVEAL constitute a secure bit-
commitment scheme with security parameter Nǫ = 1, as
can easily be checked. Using 2N ′ǫ − 1 OT-boxes in par-
allel, it is therefore possible to obtain arbitrarily secure
bit commitment.
We now consider whether one can generate an anal-
ogous bit-commitment scheme to that given above us-
ing PR-boxes (figure 1). Recall that a PR-box can be
thought of as an abstraction and generalization of a Bell-
type experiment [4], in which Alice and Bob share an
entangled system on which they can each perform one
of two different dichotomic measurements. If we denote
Alice’s and Bob’s binary inputs (their measurement set-
tings) by x and y respectively, and their binary outputs
(their measurement results) by a and b respectively, the
extremal non-local correlations given by a PR-box are of
the form
a⊕ b = xy, (1)
where all outcomes consistent with (1) are equally likely,
and each party obtains their output bit immediately af-
ter entering their input. Although such correlations are
stronger than anything attainable in quantum theory, Al-
ice and Bob cannot use the PR-box to signal to one an-
other.
In order to simulate a PR-box using an OT-box and
vice-versa, Wolf and Wullschleger propose the following
protocols [9]:
PR-box from OT-box :
31. Alice chooses a random bit a.
2. Alice inputs x0 = a and x1 = x ⊕ a into the
OT-box.
3. Bob inputs c = y into the OT-box and obtains
output b = xc. Note that b = a⊕ xc = a⊕ xy
as required.
OT-box from PR-box :
1. Alice inputs x = (x0 ⊕ x1) into the PR-box
and obtains output a.
2. Alice sends m = x0 ⊕ a to Bob
3. Bob inputs y = c into the PR-box and obtains
output b.
4. Bob computes the output xc = m ⊕ b. Note
that xc = m⊕b = x0⊕(a⊕b) = x0⊕c(x0⊕x1)
as required.
Directly applying the latter simulation procedure to
the COMMIT protocol for the OT-box, we find the anal-
ogous procedure COMMIT′ for the PR-box. The RE-
VEAL protocol is the same in both cases:
COMMIT′ :
1. Alice selects a random bit r, and her commit-
ted bit α.
2. Alice inputs x = α into the PR-box, and
records her output bit a
3. Alice sends Bob the message m = r ⊕ a
4. Bob selects a random bit s and inputs y = s
into his PR-box.
5. Bob records his output bit-string b, and com-
putes xc = b⊕m.
Apparently the correctness, privacy and secure binding
of this protocol COMMIT′ should be just as good as for
the protocol COMMIT (i.e. secure bit commitment with
Nǫ = 1), and should therefore yield arbitrarily secure
bit-commitment if enough PR-boxes are used. However,
this strongly suggests that a similar protocol based on
quantum entanglement instead of the PR-boxes should
work equally well, something proven impossible!
In fact, the PR-box protocol does not provide secure
bit commitment, as we will now show. As is the case
when proving the impossibility of quantum bit commit-
ment, it is the secure binding that fails. Indeed, unlike
the OT case, Bob has no way of telling if Alice has ap-
plied her inputs during the COMMIT′ protocol, as the
PR-box will give him an output as soon as he applies
his input, regardless of Alice’s actions. Interestingly, this
allows Alice to successfully cheat by adopting the follow-
ing strategy: During the COMMIT′ protocol, Alice does
not select her committed bit α or apply any input to
her PR-box, but instead sends a random bit m to Bob.
Then, during the REVEAL protocol, Alice chooses which
α she wishes to reveal, enters x = α into her PR-box, and
transmits r = a ⊕m (as well as her selected α) to Bob.
When he checks whether he should accept α, Bob will
find that
xc = b⊕m = r ⊕ a⊕ b = r ⊕ αs, (2)
and will therefore accept Alice’s revealed α with cer-
tainty, despite the fact that it was selected after the
COMMIT′ protocol had finished. This violates the se-
cure binding condition, which requires that only one
value of α will be accepted with probability greater than
1/2 during the REVEAL protocol (for Nǫ = 1). Even
with multiple PR-boxes in parallel, Alice can use the
same trick independently on each to cheat with certainty.
COMMIT′ and REVEAL do not therefore form a secure
bit-commitment protocol.
Let us stress that all PR-boxes must yield an output for
Bob even if Alice has not yet entered her inputs, as this
is essential to prevent signalling from Alice to Bob. This
is in full analogy with the case of quantum entanglement.
For instance, if Alice and Bob share a singlet, then Bob
can measure his half independently of Alice, and vice-
versa. There is thus no chance of Bob detecting Alice
cheating during the COMMIT′ protocol.
Consequently, despite the fact that it is possible to
simulate the outputs of an OT-box using a PR-box and
1 bit of communication, this result shows that the sim-
ulation is not universally composable. In particular, the
simulation cannot be used to implement a secure bit-
commitment protocol in the same way as the original
OT-box.
The crucial difference between the OT-box and the
PR-box lies in the time ordering of the inputs. Bob
can only obtain an output from the OT-box after Al-
ice has entered her inputs, and can therefore check to see
whether Alice has entered her inputs during the COM-
MIT protocol. In the case of the PR-box, the output
is independent of the time-ordering of the two measure-
ments, and no such check exists. [16]
In conclusion, in [9] Wolf andWullschleger showed that
there is a deep connection between a fundamental prim-
itive of non-local correlations, the PR-box, and a fun-
damental cryptographic primitive, oblivious transfer. In
particular they show that a PR-box can be used to sim-
ulate the correlations produced by an OT-box and vice-
versa.
In this letter, we have shown that such simulation is
not the whole story. In addition to recreating the correct
probability distributions, it is important to incorporate
any restrictions on the timings of the box inputs. Such re-
strictions play a crucial role in any attempt to implement
secure bit-commitment schemes using the two primitives.
We have shown that the protocols COMMIT and RE-
VEAL form a secure bit-commitment scheme using OT-
boxes. However, the analogous protocols COMMIT′ and
REVEAL, in which the OT-boxes are simulated using
PR-boxes, do not constitute a secure bit-commitment
scheme as they are not binding.
4The main issue is that, due to the non-signalling char-
acter of the PR box, Alice can postpone her measure-
ments, and actually perform them during the REVEAL
protocol, rather than the COMMIT′ protocol. We em-
phasize that it is this liberty (which is in common with
quantum mechanics) that is the main element in the no-
bit-commitment property of nature, rather than any of
the particular characteristics of quantum entanglement.
The above results were obtained for a particular bit-
commitment scheme based on the OT-box protocol.
However, we conjecture that no-bit-commitment is a gen-
eral feature of nature in the presence of non-signalling
non-local correlations, since any such correlations allow
Alice the liberty of postponing her measurements. Note
that in order for this conjecture to be true, we need to al-
low for the existence of all possible non-local correlation-
boxes (not only PR boxes) [7], and the corresponding
dynamics of such boxes (which generalize quantum evolu-
tions) [14]. Any limitations could allow bit-commitment.
This is similar to the quantum mechanical case: If Alice
can only use limited entanglement, it is easy to construct
a reliable protocol based on states for which cheating
would require more entanglement than Alice can pro-
duce.
To conclude, no signalling - no obligation to perform
the measurement until the end- no commitment!
Note added: After the completion of this work, we
became aware of a work by Buhrman et al. [15] that
addresses the same problem from a different perspective.
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